Robert L. Linn and Charles E. Werts Educational Testing Service Brewer, Campbell, and Crano (1970) have justifiably criticized the use of partial correlation procedures in hypothesis testing research where errors of measurement are not taken into consideration. Ignoring measurement errors is much more serious when dealing with partial correlations than when dealing with simple zero-order correlations.
In the latter case we know that the effect of errors of measurement, that are mutually uncorrelated and uncorrelated with true scores, is to reduce the absolute value of the zero-order correlation between the fallible measures. As Lord (1963) has pointed out, however, we cannot ordinarily know the effect of such errors of measurement on a partial correlation. Errors of measurement can increase or decrease the magnitude of a partial correlation and may even result in a partial correlation of a different sign.
As an alternative, Brewer et al. (1970) have suggested that factor analytic techniques be used to test a single-factor model before drawing conclusions about the nature of underlying conceptual variables. The purpose of the present paper is to reconsider the issues raised by these authors and the reasoning that led to their conclusions. Attention also will be given to some related arguments that were made in a recent attack on some commonly used methods for the evaluation of compensatory educational programs (Campbell & Erlebacher, 1970) . Our thesis is that the basic problem is a lack of relevant information--a problem that cannot be resolved by the choice of a statistical procedure. Provided that C is positive, it may be seen from (2) 
Bias in Partial Correlation
Brewer et al. (1970) argue that errors of measurement introduce a systematic bias into partial correlations. More specifically, they state:
the assumption is made that the variable being partialled out contains no unique components and is measured without error. Using partialling techniques when these assumptions are not met introduces systematic bias toward the unparsimonious conclusion that more conceptual factors are involved in a phenomenon than may actually be the case" (Brewer et al., 1970, pp. 1-2) .
Although it is true that this may be the effect of a violation of the assumption of an error free measure, the bias may be in the opposite direction.
It is easy to construct an example where the direction of the bias is toward a more parsimonious conclusion that fewer conceptual factors are involved in a phenomenon than is actually the case. The correlation between T2 and T3 with X1 partialed out would be 0.0 which would result in the more parsimonious, but erroneous conclusion that a second conceptual variable is not required. There is no intention to imply by this illustration that the bias of errors of measurement is typically, or even frequently, in the direction of producing a partial correlation that is closer to zero. Rather the point is that the direction of the bias cannot be determined without imposing additional assumptions (e.g., all reliabilities (1963) has noted, the need to make corrections for attenuation "...poses somewhat of a dilemma, since, first, it is often hard to obtain the particular kind of reliability coefficients that are required for making the appropriate correction, and, further, the partial corrected for attenuation may be seriously affected by sampling errors. These obstacles can hardly justify the use of an uncorrected coefficient that may have the wrong sign, however" (Lord, 1963, p. 36 ).
The Single Factor Model vs. Partial Correlations
As noted above, Brewer et al. (1970) have suggested that a single-factor model be tested before conclusions are drawn about the nature of underlying conceptual variables from partial correlations. We shall argue that partial correlation analyses and factor analyses are based on different models and pose different questions.
Knowing that a single factor can reproduce the intercorrelations among three observed fallible variables is not sufficient to draw conclusions about the partial correlations among the underlying conceptual variables or true scores that correspond to the observed scores.
Assuming that three infallible measures ( T1 , T2 , and T3 ) have a multivariate normal distribution, the partial correlation between T2 and is held constant is not the same.as the question answered by a test for single factoredness for the observed scores. This is, in principle, acknowledged by Brewer et al. (1970) in footnote number 3 where they discuss an example in which the control variable (I.Q.) has a factor loading of .43.
They conclude that "...if one has 'factored out' a variable upon which I.Q.
loads only .43, one has not in any meaningful sense 'factored out I.Q.'" (Brewer et al., 1970, p. 7) . They go on to indicate that they are working on a technique of "focused factoring," wherein the control variables are used to define the factor. Hopefully this procedure would exclude from the communality of a control variable only that variance that properly might be considered error variance.
Iftheobservedvariables(X.1 )are related to their underlying true scores (T.) by the model, X. Regions 2a, 3a, 1l, 6a, 7a, and 8
are of interest since they define combinations of p T.T and p T.T for i k which a partial correlation for observed scores and a partial correlation for true scores have opposite signs. Regions 1, 2a, 3a, 4, 5, 6a, 7a, and 8 are where a satisfactory single-factor solution is obtained yet all three correlations between pairs of true scores with the third true score partialed out are nonzero. Different conclusions about the number of underlying conceptual variables involved in the phenomenon presumably would be drawn for instances in those regions.
This problem should not be dealt with by simply invoking the principle of parsimony and thereby concluding that the fit of a single factor model indicates that there is only one dimension underlying the phenomenon.
Rather, the problem should be dealt with by obtaining the additional information that -10-is necessary to make inferences within a given model. A brief discussion of the use of multiple measures to obtain the needed information is presented below in the section on needed additional information.
Errors of Measurement in the Analysis of Covariance
Campbell and Erlebacher (1970) have provided a much needed criticism of the common misuse of the analysis of covariance as a means of trying to adjust for preexisting differences between experimental and control groups for the evaluation of compensatory education programs. They argue that "error" and "uniqueness" in the covariate result in bias when the groups differ on the direction of underestimating the slope of the regression of the dependent variable, on the covariate (for a good discussion see Cochran, 1968 ). Porter (1967) has illustrated the nature of the resulting bias for various group differences in means on the covariate and on the dependent variable. When using the analysis of covariance, bias due to errors of measurement in the covariate might make a compensatory education program look bad (or good).
The effect of "uniqueness" depends on its sources. If uniqueness is due to errors of validity (e.g., a perfectly reliable symptom of the underlying variable), then bias will result in the same way that it does from unreliability.
On the other hand, if uniqueness merely refers to unshared variance between the covariate and the dependent variable as in Campbell and Erlebacher's (1970) treatment of covariance adjustments, then the question of bias is ambiguous. Given independent errors, unshared variance may be due to unreliability, invalidity or a lack of perfect correlation between underlying variables.
The latter is not a source of bias and should not be corrected for as is done by Campbell and Erlebacher's adjustment procedure.
This problem needs to be viewed from the perspective of Lord's (1967) paradox. Lord has shown that the comparison of preexisting groups by means of an analysis of covariance (statistician 2) and by means of an analysis of difference scores (statistician 1) can result in paradoxically different results, both of which are manifestly correct.
In his hypothetical illustrative example, Lord depicted an experiment in which girls received one diet and boys another. For each group the mean and variance of the final weight was identical to the mean and variance of the initial weight. There were preexisting differences between the groups in mean weight, and for each group the within-group correlation between initial and final weight was .50.
Assuming that the weight measures are error free, the above correlation would be the correlation between true initial weight and true final weight.
In the absence of measurement errors the analysis of mean change would indicate no "treatment" effect, whereas the analysis of covariance would indicate a "treatment" effect.
Campbell and Erlebacher (1970) have suggested that in pretest-posttest designs a "common-factor coefficient" might be used to correct for errors of measurement and uniqueness in the covariate. Using the proper common factor coefficients for both pretest and posttest in the standard correction for attenuation formula would result in a "corrected" pretest-posttest correlation of 1.00. Assuming equal coefficients for the pretest and the posttest, the common factor coefficient for Lord's example would be .50. Applying this "correction" would increase the slope of the within-group regression lines to 1.00 and result in identical intercepts for the two groups. In essence,
Campbell and Erlebacher have devised a roundabout way of siding with Lord's first statistician. However, they have not resolved Lord's paradox. Rather -12-than impose a restriction, such as the one that the "corrected" correlation between pretest and posttest be 1.00 (which, in our opinion, is unjustified), it would seem far better to conclude with Lord (1967) that ". . . there simply is no logical or statistical procedure that can be counted on to make
proper allowances for uncontrolled preexisting differences between groups" (p. 305).
Needed Additional Information for Fallible Measures
Dealing with fallible measures will generally require additional assumptions and additional information. In some instances, using parallel forms of one or more of the measures may provide the needed additional information.
One difficulty with this procedure is that most observed measures are really symptoms or indirect measures of the variable or influence to be measured, which is to say that even if the symptoms were measured with perfect reliability, they would be imperfectly correlated with the "true" variable. 
Conclusion
From our perspective, "focusing on the conceptual problem of choosing a one-factor vs. a two-factor model" (Brewer et al., 1970, p. 3) distracts the researcher's attention from the task of constructing a model which is consistent with everything we know or hypothesize about the phenomena under study.
Any inferences will necessarily be no more valid than the assumptions made about reality. For heuristic purposes we have assumed that the linear additive model was relevant; however, there is no rule of nature that effects are either linear or additive. No provision was made, e.g., for catalytic, feedback, or interactional type influences.
it is important for the research design to be set up to study the question of which of the plausible alternative models more closely simulates reality. Rather than focus on the conceptual problem of choosing a one-factor vs. a two-factor model, it seems to us far more worthwhile to spend time in designing the study to explore the relevant alternate models, ensuring collection of the information necessary to test which is the best simulation of reality. Depending on the problem, the factor model may be one of the alternatives. The assumption that the factor model is a priori relevant appears to us to be unjustified given the current state of the art. We are grateful to Frederic M. Lord for suggesting the idea that was used for the illustrative example in Figure 1 . 
